FACTS: In the early morning of January 23, 1994, Besana was at a benefit dance together with Isidro. The accused Roger approached Isidro from behind, place his hand on Isidro 's shoulder, and stabbed him in his stomach. Besana described the weapon as "a small long knife" and twice demonstrated how Roger stabbed Isidro. After the incident, Roger fled the scene. Several men brought Isidro to the hospital and while in the surgical ward, Nelly Buni, the widow of Isidro, asked Isidro who could have stabbed him. The latter replied that he failed to see the assailant because the latter came from behind. Isidro eventually died. Roger invoked self-defense. He asserts that there was a prior altercation between him and the deceased. The latter assaulted him and then brought out a knife. He feared for his life and tried to wrest the knife away. In taking possession thereof he stabbed the victim. Subsequently, the trial court convicted Roger. It appreciated treachery because the accused, without any provocation, suddenly attacked the victim from behind without giving the latter an opportunity to defend himself. On appeal, Roger argued that the testimony of Besana that Roger came from behind the victim and stabbed the latter with one hand while the other hand was placed on the victim's shoulder does not establish treachery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is qualified by treachery.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The prosecution clearly established that the killing was attended with treachery. This is culled from the testimonies of eyewitness Gigger Besana and the victim's widow, Nelly Buni. Besana declared that the attacked was sudden, swift, and without any provocation, thus leaving the victim totally defenseless . Nelly Buni testified that when she inquired from her husband who could have attacked him, his reply was that he was unable to see his assailant because the latter came from behind. Jurisprudence has consistently held that an unprovoked, sudden, and unexpected attack by the accused towards the back of an unarmed victim, unabling the victim to defend himself is an attack done in a manner which directly and specifically insures the execution thereof without any risk to the accused which may arise from the defense the victim may make. [People vs. Dorado; G.R. No. 122248; February 11, 1999; First Division--- Davide, Jr., C.J.]

TREACHERY; As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused.

FACTS: Emmaculada Academia, mother of the accused, lost forty pesos at the house of one Francisco Pines. Brono Baldado was suspected as the thief. Thereafter, accused, together with his younger brother, went to look for Baldado and later challenged the latter's father, Erlindo, to a fight. An argument about the money that was lost ensued between the accused and Erlindo. The victim, Edmar Canete, who was then about five arms length away from the accused, tried to pacify them by pointing out that they were relatives. Accused, however, refused to listen to Edmar. He replied, "Edmar, don't intervene on this lest I will shoot you." Forthwith, accused fired twice, hitting Edmar in the stomach. The latter eventually died. The version of the defense is that accused is a member of the Civilian Volunteers Organization which helps in the counter-insurgency drive in Negros Oriental. The victim, Edmar, was allegedly a member of the CPP/NPA. Accused claimed that a masked man tried to steal his pigs one evening prompting him to fire a shot. Days later, he was arrested for the killing of Edmar Canete. Subsequently, the accused was convicted of murder by the trial court. It found that the killing was attended by treachery as the victim was unaware of the murderous design by accused. Moreover, the shooting was sudden, without warning and made at pointblank range, thereby affording the victim no opportunity to put up any defense. The lower court found the accused not exposed to any risk whatsoever. This appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not the offense charged is qualified by treachery.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused. In the case at bar, evidence is wanting that treachery was employed by the accused when he shot the victim. At the onset of the incident, his ire was directed against Brono and Erlindo. The victim was not the object of accused's anger. He became so only when the victim tried to intercede. Accused could not have carefully thought about the manner on how he will shoot the victim. He could not have consciously adopted his mode of attack for he did it in a fit of uncontrollable rage. [People vs. Academia; G.R. No. 129251; May 18, 1999; Second Division--- Puno, J.]

TREACHERY; Even if the assault were frontal, the fact that it was sudden or totally unexpected, thus giving the victim no opportunity to retaliate, definitely points to the presence of treachery.

FACTS: On their way home from the market, the accused, Rebamontan inconspicuously walked first in front of the victim Cagrado, without manifestation of his criminal plan. When he got behind the unsuspecting victim, he stabbed him at the time that the victim turned around, hence the fatal blow hit the chest of the victim. The victim died because of the stab wound.

ISSUE: Whether or not treachery can be appreciated when the blow was frontal.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the fact that the victim was facing his assailant at the same moment as the latter's attack did not erase its treacherous nature. If it was not for the timely turn around of the victim, he could have been hit at the back. He had absolutely no opportunity to parry the blow. Even if the assault were frontal, the fact that it was sudden or totally unexpected, thus giving the victim no opportunity to retaliate, definitely points to the presence of treachery. The essence of treachery is the swiftness and the unexpectedness of the attack upon the unsuspecting and unarmed victim, who does not give the slightest provocation. [People of the Philippines vs. Hilario Rebamontan; G. R. No. 125318; April 13, 1999; EN BANC --- Panganiban, J.]

WARRANTLESS ARREST; In determining whether there is a sufficient probable cause for a police officer to believe that a person is then and there committing a crime, it has been held that a tipped information is a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.

FACTS: SPO1 Bernardo Mariano was in Banaue, Ifugao waiting for a ride to report for work. A civilian asset approached him and intimated that an llocano person was ready to transport marijuana. This asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as thin and possessing a green bag. When a bus bound for Manila arrived, Mariano boarded it and looked for that person from among the passengers. Mariano noticed the accused holding the green bag. He ordered the suspect to open the bag and saw a water jug and a lunch box. He told the man to open the jug and the lunch box and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents. The lower court found the accused guilty of the crime of illegal transport of marijuana leaves. On appeal, the accused contends that the marijuana allegedly seized from him was the product of an unlawful search, hence, inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and search of Valdez effected by Mariano was legal.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nevertheless, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: (1) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (2) when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (3) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, Valdez was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by Valdez, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of Valdez, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that Valdez was then and there committing a crime. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with instances where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, police officer Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses coming from Banaue in view of the information he got from the civilian "asset" that somebody having the same appearance as that of appellant and with a green bag would be transporting marijuana from Banaue. He likewise had probable cause to search appellant's belongings since he fits the description given by the civilian "asset". Since there was a valid warrantless search by the police officer, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against appellant. [People vs. Valdez, CR. No. 127801, March 3,1999; SECOND DIVISION--- Quisumbing, J.]

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; One could be convicted of robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things, constitutes robbery.

FACTS: Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco is a dentist who was at her clinic in Paranaque, Metro Manila when Christopher Leonor inquired about the cost of a tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee, Leonor said that he would come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came back and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was preparing her dental instruments when Leonor barged in and demanded money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money was on the table, but this notwithstanding, Leonor stabbed her, grabbed her watch and ran away. Dr. Tarlenco struggled out of the clinic and shouted for help. Leonor was caught by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted by people running after a person with a bloodied shift. Leonor was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Leonor, for his defense, argued that he should be charged with the crime of homicide only. He admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco but denied that he had taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leonor killed Dr. Tarlengco by reason or on the occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. One could be convicted of robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. In the case at bar, the robbery was duly and satisfactorily established by the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father. Moreover, testimonies from other witnesses indicate that Leonor stole personal property belonging to Dr. Tarlengco after items identified as belonging to the latter were recovered from Leonor. The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of her possession by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of robbery. The prosecution was able to prove that there was violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr. Tarlengco's property from the latter's dying declaration wherein she narrated that after surrendering her money, Leonor stabbed her and took her watch as she lay injured. The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was committed, there being violence and intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of said robbery. [People vs. Leonor, G.R. No. 125053, March 25, 1999;- EN BANC--- Davide, Jr. C.J.]

SELF-DEFENSE; Accused's admissions that he fled, hid for four months and surfaced only when his bail was ready---taken with his failure to invoke self-defense at the outset and his waiver of his right to present evidence in the preliminary investigation---strongly contradict the actions of an innocent man.

FACTS: In the early morning of January 23, 1994, Besana was at a benefit dance together with Isidro. The accused Roger approached Isidro from behind, place his hand on Isidro 's shoulder, and stabbed him in his stomach. Besana described the weapon as "a small long knife" and twice demonstrated how Roger stabbed Isidro. The latter eventually died. Roger invoked self-defense. He asserts that there was a prior altercation between him and the deceased. The latter assaulted him and then brought out a knife. He feared for his life and tried to wrest the knife away. In taking possession thereof he stabbed the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the killing of lsidro Buņi was an act of self-defense.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance must satisfy the following requirements: (I) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified is on the accused. In so doing, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. In the case at bar, immediately after the stabbing, Roger fled. He also admitted that he was in hiding. He remained in hiding until his bail bond was ready four months after the incident. His explanation for not surrendering earlier was that the victim's family was powerful and on that fateful night, the victim had several companions. Yet on cross-examination he admitted that he hid because at that time he had no bail bond. These admissions that he fled, he hid for four months and surfaced only when his bail was ready--- taken with his failure to invoke self-defense at the outset and his waiver of his right to present evidence in the preliminary investigation strongly contradict the actions of an innocent man. These acts can only be attributed to a guilty conscience, for an innocent man will readily surrender and clear his name. Roger's flight evidences guilt. His alleged fear of the deceased's companions and powerful family deserves scant consideration. The Court concluded that the defense's version was contrived to exculpate Roger of his crime. [People vs. Dorado; G.R. No. 122248; February 11, 1999; First Division--- Davide, Jr., C.J.]

SELF-DEFENSE; By invoking self-defense. accused-appellant admits that he killed the victim. The burden is on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the following essential requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and] (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Antonio Eribal was charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed against Lin Ho Chan. Prosecution witness Mrs. Arsaga testified that she was tending her store located across the house of the victim when Eribal approached her and told her that Chan stared sharply at him. Eribal asked Yorac, a carpenter who was doing repairs in the house of Chan, if he could talk to the latter. Thereafter, Chan emerged from the house. Mrs. Arsaga heard Chan tell Eribal that he had a defective eyesight and that if ever Eribal misinterpreted his stare he apologized for it. Subsequently however, Mrs. Arsaga heard a . shot. She saw Eribal with a gun pointed at Chan. Eribal fired another shot at Chan and immediately left the scene. This was corroborated by the testimony of another prosecution witness, Yorac. Eribal, on the other hand, interposed the defense of self-defense. He testified that in the afternoon of 13 April 1993 he, on his "trisikad," and Chan, on his motorcycle figured in a near-collision. Chan allegedly pointed a finger and stared sharply at him. Thereafter, Chan proceeded to his house. Eribal followed the victim to talk to the latter about the incident. Eribal met Chan at the front gate outside the house and asked Chan why the latter was angry with him. Chan told him to leave. Eribal refused to do so and instead, he asked Chan why he was so harsh. Chan again told him to leave, pushing him and threatening him while taking out his gun from his back and pointed at Eribal. Eribal was able to hold Chan's arm with the barrel of the gun pointing towards Chan and then the gun fired. While Chan was slowly falling, Eribal fired the gun again out of nervousness. He did not know whether he hit Chan because Chan was falling down. After the trial, the lower court gave more weight to the prosecution's evidence. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was able to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of self-defense.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. First, Eribal claims that it was Chan who pulled a gun on him thereby implying that the unlawful aggression originated from Chan. However, no clear and convincing evidence supports this claim. It was he who followed Chan to the latter's house after the near-collision. He was the one who felt offended by Chan's alleged stare. Moreover, Arsaga and Yorac did not hear any scuffle between Eribal and Chan. Immediately after they heard the first shot, they turned to look. What they saw was Eribal holding the gun and firing it again to Chan. The foregoing circumstances belie the allegation that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Second, Eribal's subsequent act of firing at Chan while the latter was already at the ground further disproves his claim of self-defense. Assuming that the unlawful aggression came from Chan, such aggression ceased when Eribal allegedly wrestled the gun from the victim and accidentally shot Chan. Instead, Eribal proceeded to fire two more shots at Chan. It was overkill for Eribal to again shoot Chan. This negates any reasonable necessity of the means employed by Eribal to prevent or repel aggression from the victim. [People vs. Eribal; GR No 127662; March 25, 1999; FIRST DIVISION--- Davide, Jr. , C.J.]

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; To warrant the ruling of evident premeditation, there must be sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Antonio Eribal was charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed against Lin Ho Chan. Prosecution witness Mrs. Arsaga testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 13 April 1993, Eribal approached her and told her that Chan stared sharply at him (during a near-collision incident some thirty (30) minutes ago). Upon seeing Yorac, a carpenter who was doing repairs in the house of Chan, Eribal asked him if he could talk to Chan. Thereafter, Chan emerged from his house. Mrs. Arsaga heard Chan tell Eribal that he had a defective eyesight and that if ever Eribal misinterpreted his stare he apologized for it. Subsequently however, Mrs. Arsaga heard a shot. When she turned to look, she saw Eribal with a gun pointed at Chan while the latter was pressing his chest and turning his back. This was corroborated by the testimony of another prosecution witness, Yorac. The Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City found evident premeditation in the shooting of Chan. Accordingly, it convicted the accused of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, Eribal challenges the trial court's conclusion that evident premeditation attended the shooting. He asserts that there was no evident premeditation because the shooting was an "act of the moment perhaps spurred by a harsh offensive or challenging remark" as between two hot heads just coming out of a traffic collision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its conclusion that evident premeditation attended the shooting.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The prosecution established no clear and convincing proof as to (a) the time when the accused was determined to commit the crime; (b) the act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. In the instant case, the proven lapse of thirty minutes between the determination and execution of the crime was not sufficient time for Eribal to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [Peop1e vs. Eribal; G.R. No. 127662; March 25, 1999; FIRST DIVISION--- Davide, Jr., C.J.]

INDIVISIBLE PENALTY; It is an elementary rule that where two indivisible penalties are prescribed for an offense and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

FACTS: In an incident which occurred on the evening of April 22, 1994, Rebamontan stabbed Cagrado causing the latter's death. On trial, the prosecution alleged evident premeditation and treachery to qualify the offense. The defense, on the other hand, purported voluntary surrender as the mitigating circumstance. Subsequently thereafter, the trial court ruled treachery as an aggravating circumstance while discrediting that of the defense. The accused was found guilty as charged and was sentenced with death penalty. Hence, this automatic review by the Supreme court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing death penalty upon the accused.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Even if the killing was qualified with treachery, without the attendance of any other aggravating circumstance, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon the appellant. In murder, the imposition of death is not automatic. The law prescribes the penalty range of reclusion perpetual to death. It is an elementary rule that where two indivisible penalties are prescribed for an offense and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The correct penalty is reclusion perpetual. [People of the Philippines vs. Hilario Rebamontan; G. R. No. 125318; April 13, 1999; EN BANC --- Panganiban, J.]

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; The mere fact that the accused did not resist or deny his criminal act cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. To be voluntary, a surrender must be spontaneous and deliberate; that is, there must be intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities.

FACTS: After a stabbing incident, the accused-appellant Hilario Rebamontan fled. Through the information gathered from the eyewitnesses, Police Officer Doligon searched for the accused whom he personally know. He found him towards the direction of the highway and called him. The accused got near him at once. When asked if he was the one who stabbed the victim, he confirmed the same. Consequently, he was arrested.

ISSUE: Whether or not voluntary surrender can be appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It is clear from the circumstances that it was the police officer who went looking for the accused-appellant. The mere fact that he did not resist his arrest or deny his criminal act cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. To be voluntary, there must be spontaneous and deliberate intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities.
[People of the Philippines vs. Hilario Rebamontan; G. R. No. 125318; April 13, 1999; EN BANC --- Panganiban, J.]